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 Demographic Analysis and Population
 Catastrophes in the USSR:
 A Rejoinder to Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver
 Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver have recently attempted to settle the controversy over
 the economic and demographic consequences of Stalinism by "demonstrating . . . how
 sensitive estimates of excess mortality are to the assumptions that are made about de-
 mographic data and the 'natural' course of demographic change" because they think that
 "the demographic evidence has been misunderstood and misused, and that the sensitivity
 of demographic estimates to assumptions made about the levels of mortality and fertility,
 as well as about the accuracy and completeness of Soviet census data and vital statistics,
 has not been given adequate attention.", This formulation suggests that readers of the
 Slavic Review do not realize how difficult it is to estimate the Gulag forced labor popu-
 lation and to quantify the casualties caused by collectivization, Gulag, and the Terror;
 that they are unaware that estimates of these sorts are controversial; and that they do
 not fully appreciate how specific errors mar the credibility of some analysts' calculations.
 The first two propositions do not warrant serious consideration. There may be some
 specialists who do not appreciate that the enormous disparity between Murray Feshbach's
 and Frank Lorimer's excess death estimates (20 million versus 5.5 million during the
 1930s) indicates that the subjects under discussion are both sensitive to assumptions and
 controversial, but there certainly cannot be many. The merit of Anderson's and Silver's
 contribution therefore turns on whether they objectively prove their contention that some
 estimates are inferior to others.
 The estimates they censure include those of Feshbach (by implication), Eason, Rose-
 fielde, Conquest, Antonov-Ovseenko, Maksudov, Mace, and Diadkin; the approved esti-
 mates are those of Lorimer and Wheatcroft. Since this division parallels established lines of
 controversy, their essay in effect attempts to demonstrate that the Stalinist characteriza-
 tion of the human and material costs of forced industrialization is broadly correct. It is
 argued, purportedly on positivist grounds, that there are no compelling reasons to believe
 that more than a few million Soviet citizens perished from collectivization, Gulag, and the
 Terror2 or that the Gulag forced labor population was abnormally high during the 1930s.3
 1. Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes
 in the USSR," Slavic Review 44 (Fall 1985): 517, 519. Anderson and Silver acknowledge that "the
 demographic history of the Soviet Union is marked by catastrophes. . . . [attributable in part to] the
 collectivization of agriculture and the famine." Like Wheatcroft, however, they avoid attributing a
 significant number of these catastrophic deaths to Gulag and the Terror and favor technical adjust-
 ments of the sort suggested by Lorimer that reduce famine and collectivization deaths to diminutive
 proportions (ibid., p. 517). Their comments about Lorimer's estimates as measures of "statistical
 consistency" rather than excess deaths should be read in this light (ibid., p. 520).
 2. Lorimer estimated that there were 5.5 million excess deaths between 1 January 1929 and
 1 January 1939 but refrained from firmly attributing them to collectivization, Gulag, and the Terror.
 See Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of
 Nations, 1946), p. 134. Wheatcroft frequently adopts the position that most estimated excess deaths
 have innocent causes but has recently been willing to concede the possibility of significant, policy-
 related losses. See Stephen Wheatcroft, "Population Dynamic and Factors Affecting it, in the Soviet
 Union in the 1920s and 1930s," part 2, CREES Discussion Papers, Birmingham University (U.K.),
 1976, p. 70; and idem, "New Demographic Evidence on Excess Collectivization Deaths: Yet Another
 Kliukva from Steven Rosefielde?" Slavic Review 44 (Fall 1985): 508.
 3. Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 519. For a
 discussion of the normal level of Gulag forced labor see CIA, Crime and Punishment in the Soviet
 Union, GC79-10010, March 1979 (Confidential); U.S. House Subcommittee on Human Rights and
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 These inferences are manifestly biased because Anderson and Silver do not even-
 handedly consider the statistical strengths and weakness of the contending estimates. For
 example, while they excoriate the assumptions underlying estimates they disapprove, no
 attempt is made to demonstrate that the crucial adjustment to the 1926-1927 census
 mortality statistic that sustains Lorimer's and Wheatcroft's estimates, which Lorimer him-
 self characterized as "arbitrary," is scientifically valid.4 The one-sidedness of their ap-
 proach is shown further in the superficiality of their critique of my estimates, especially
 those pertaining to collectivization, Gulag, and Terror excess deaths.
 In a series of articles I have demonstrated that the Soviet Union incurred between
 3.5 million and 15 million more excess deaths from 1 January 1929 to 1 January 1939 than
 Lorimer had previously computed.5 These estimates are conceptually and methodologi-
 cally identical with Lorimer's, differing only with regard to a few disputable statistics. I
 replace Lorimer's prewar natality and mortality data with more complete postwar series
 and adjust the 1926-1927 census mortality rate in accordance with Ansley Coale's cal-
 culations instead of Lorimer's.6 In addition I not only consider the 1939 census figure but
 also extend my data set to include the 1937 census population statistic reported by
 International Organizations of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Forced Labor in the Soviet Union,
 House of Representatives and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 9 December
 1983, p. 103; Ger P. van der Berg, "The Stalinist System of Justice and Terror in Figures and Some
 Lessons for the Present Day," paper presented at the Third World Congress for Soviet and East
 European Studies, Washington, 30 October to 4 November 1985; and Steven Rosefielde, "Knowledge
 and Deception: Stalinist Industrialization Reconsidered," Soviet Studies (forthcoming, April 1987).
 Compare Gabor Tamas Rittersporn, "Soviet Officialdom and Political Evolution: Judiciary Appa-
 ratus and Penal Policy in the 1930s," Theory and Society 13 (1984): 211-237. Anderson and Silver
 incorrectly assert that "Rosefielde's main interest has been in estimating the size of the Soviet prison
 camp population" (Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes,"
 p. 517). My main interest is in scientifically reconstructing the Soviet development experience and
 interpreting it from the standpoint of economic systems theory. They then quote Conquest to suggest
 that "we are unlikely to be able to deduce with any certainty the labour camp population from any
 of the demographic material presently available" (ibid., p. 519). This formulation misstates my intent.
 I can and do use the demographic evidence to demonstrate that my Gulag forced labor estimates
 are not disconfirmed by plausible estimates of contemporaneous excess deaths. Compare Robert
 Conquest, "Forced Labour Statistics: Some Comments," Soviet Studies 34 (July 1982): 438.
 4. Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, p. 119. "These assumptions are obviously arbi-
 trary. Compare Steven Rosefielde, "New Demographic Evidence on Collectivization Deaths:
 A Rejoinder to Steven Wheatcroft," Slavic Review 44 (Fall 1985): 514. The most Anderson and
 Silver venture in this regard is the hollow assertion that the logic of my critique of Lorimer's ad-
 justment is "invisible." Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes,"
 p. 523.
 5. Steven Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the De-
 mographic Consequences of Forced Industrialization 1929-1949," Soviet Studies 35 (July 1983): 385-
 409; idem, "New Demographic Evidence on Collectivization Deaths 1929-33: The Demographic
 Evidence," Slavic Review 42 (Spring 1984): 83-88; idem, "New Demographic Evidence on Collec-
 tivization Deaths: A Rejoinder to Steven Wheatcroft," 509-516; idem, "Excess Deaths and Indus-
 trialization: A Realist Theory of Stalinist Economic Development in the Thirties," Journal of
 Contemporary History (forthcoming, July 1987); idem, "Knowledge and Deception"; idem, "An
 Assessment of the Sources and Uses of Gulag Forced Labour 1929-56," Soviet Studies 33 (January
 1981): 51-87.
 Anderson and Silver contend that Lorimer's methodology was only used as a test of statistical
 consistency, not excess deaths. This contention is both logically and factually specious. See Lorimer,
 Population of the Soviet Union, p. 133, "Actually, there is a discrepancy of about 5.5 million. One
 possible interpretation of this discrepancy is that it represents the magnitude of 'excess mortality'
 beyond that normally expected during the period of the collectivization of agriculture."
 6. Ansley Coale's adjustment is an important and plausible component of Lorimer's more am-
 bitious recomputation; see Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, p. 117.
 302 Slavic Review
 Antonov-Ovseenko. The estimates computed from these data reflect the official record
 with one definite and one possible exception. Coale's adjustment reduces officially implied
 excess deaths by 1.5 million people,7 and the suppressed 1937 population statistic cannot
 be independently confirmed.
 Anderson and Silver do not dispute the intrinsic merit of this approach, but they
 claim nonetheless that my estimates are flawed because the official data I employ are
 deficient and because I fail to adjust vital statistics according to a right understanding of
 "the 'natural' course of demographic change."8 The data I employ, other than Antonov-
 Ovseenko's 1937 census statistic, are deficient, it is contended, not because they are
 unofficial, but because some official figures are "estimates" masquerading as "statistics"
 and others that purport to be "new" are not. More precisely, it is alleged that I have
 misconstrued Urlanis's natalitv rate estimates for 1931, 1933, and 1934 and treat them as
 if they were obtained directly from unpublished official demographic survey data when
 they are merely estimates based on the official figure for 1932.9 This criticism is easily
 disproved. The offending estimates are clearly bracketed and explained in the appropriate
 tables with the statement: "Bracketed natality rates are Urlanis's estimates.'"10 Suppose,
 however, that I had neglected to bracket Urlanis's estimates, would my results necessarily
 be biased? Anderson and Silver intimate that this is the case but a binary comparison of
 the official natality series I employ with Lorimer's reveals that the number of estimates
 he uses exceeds mine by 200 percent.11 His natality estimates for the critical years 1931
 to 1934, moreover, exceed Urlanis's, generating higher and not, as my critics maintain,
 lower excess death counts.12
 Anderson and Silver in raising the issue of estimates, of course, wish to make the
 larger point that during the chaos of collectivization, Gulag, and the Terror, Soviet de-
 mographic data collection was probably in disarray and, as a consequence, vital statistics
 should be regarded with suspicion. This council is well taken; however, not only does it
 tacitly concede my main point that extraordinary causes are apt to have calamitous effects,
 but it fails to take account of two important facts: First, as Rosa Sifman's anamnestic
 survey research has shown, the negative impact of demographic shocks are often damp-
 ened by compensatory fertility adjustments. Her data indicate that, although the natality
 rate did decline between 1930 and 1934, it decreased less rapidly than expected, in line
 with the intercensus trend rate.13 This suggests that it is unreasonable to assume, as
 Anderson and Siver do, that the official natality rates for 1932 and 1935, which are well
 below those implied by Sifman, are substantially overstated. Second, Urlanis's disclosure
 that the Soviet population in 1933 was 158 million instead of 165.7 million, as Stalin
 claimed,14 and similar estimates derived by van den Berg from Gertsenzon and Shlia-
 pochnikov's sentencing data clearly suggest that credible unpublished statistics were being
 7. Compare Rosefielde, "Knowledge and Deception," table Al, with Rosefielde, "Excess Mor-
 tality in the Soviet Union," table 3, p. 388.
 8. Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 517.
 9. Ibid., pp. 523-524. The same argument is obliquely levied against my wartime natality es-
 timates. See note 24, below.
 10. Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union," table 3, p. 388.
 11. Ibid., table 2, p. 387. For a fuller discussion of the differences between these data see
 Rosefielde, "Knowledge and Deception."
 12. Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 524.
 13. Rosa Sifman, Dinamika rozhdaemosti v SSSR (Moscow: Statistika, 1974), figure 2, p. 43.
 Sifman uses the cumulative fertility behavior of twenty-nine-year-old women as her proxy for the
 real natality rate. Cf. Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes,"
 pp. 530-531. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Rosefielde, "Knowledge and Decep-
 tion."
 14. Stalin, "Otchetnyi doklad," 1934, p. 25, cited in Ger P. van den Berg, The Soviet System of
 Justice: Figures and Policy (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 176.
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 collected during the early 1930s but were too politically sensitive to be publicly disclosed.15
 It may therefore be concluded that, while the reliability of Soviet vital statistics was
 impaired by the trauma of the times, they are probably more accurate than might be
 casually surmised.
 The assertion that the vital statistics underlying my excess death estimate are not
 "new" is similarly misleading. As indicated above, they close gaps in the data base
 employed by Lorimer and may well take account of previously suppressed information.
 Anderson and Silver cannot deny the former, but they do assert without proof that the
 new vital statistics are merely recompilations of previously published series. They could
 be right, but this seems unlikely because the new and old statistics not only differ, but,
 as Urlanis has shown, the Soviets possess suppressed information, which they are occa-
 sionally willing to disclose.16
 My new statistics are condemned further, because like Robert Conquest I believe
 that the 1939 census was fraudulent and compute a set of excess death estimates on the
 supposition that the 1937 census statistic published by Antonov-Ovseenko could be ac-
 curate. These calculations are summarily dismissed because Anderson and Silver assert
 that "this number . . . comes from the rumor mill in Soviet labor camps,"17 implying that
 Antonov-Ovseenko's sources are disreputable. A close reading of Portret tirana, however,
 indicates that the sources he describes,18 which he maintains were his direct sources,19 are
 credible. This does not prove that they are correct, but it suggests that it would be
 imprudent to dismiss them, especially since Wheatcroft admits that the 1939 census con-
 tains 1 million to 2.5 million "dead souls."20
 The allegation of Anderson and Silver that my excess death estimates are exaggerated
 because I misuse official data and mishandle missing observations thus cannot be objec-
 tively sustained. If my estimates do err the fault must lie elsewhere, in systematic biases
 that distort the official statistics I employ. This statement, then, brings us to the nub of
 the matter. Anderson and Silver insist that mortality rates based on official Soviet census,
 and noncensus estimates for the late 1920s, which crucially affect my excess death esti-
 mates, are wrong and they contend that they know how to correct these errors.21 They
 assert further that, if their adjustments are accepted, the 10.5 million excess deaths gen-
 erated by the official statistics can be reduced to 5.5 million or less.22 Perhaps, but the
 burden is on them to prove it. In a matter as serious as the one under discussion, they
 cannot persuasively rest their case on Lorimer's authority when it is clear that his ad-
 mittedly arbitrary adjustment was based on his subjective assessment of the probable
 15. Ibid.
 16. Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths 1929-33," and "New Demographic Evidence,"
 pp. 510-511. Compare Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes,"
 p. 523.
 17. Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," pp. 525-526.
 18. Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, Portret tirana (New York: Khronika, 1980), p. 211.
 19. Antonov-Ovseenko, personal testimony.
 20. Stephen Wheatcroft, "A Note on Steven Rosefielde's Calculations of Excess Mortality in
 the USSR, 1929-49," Soviet Studies 36 (April 1984): 278 and 281. Also see idem, "Population
 Dynamic and the Factors Affecting It, in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s," Part I, SIPS
 No. 1, University of Birmingham (U.K.), 1976, p. 36. Compare Anderson and Silver, "Demographic
 Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 526. "Although the 1939 census probably contains errors
 the existence and magnitude of other forms of misenumeration in that census have not been dem-
 onstrated."
 21. Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 523. They
 simply accept Lorimer's "arbitrary" adjustment. It should also be observed that they restrict their
 discussion to the 1926-1927 census mortality rate, ignoring the fact that mortality rates for subsequent
 years belie their preferred adjustment.
 22. Ibid., table 1, column 3, p. 528; table 3, column 3, row 6, p. 531.
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 consquences of Stalinism. With the limited information at his disposal in the 1940s it is
 not surprising that he was prepared to entertain the possibility that nearly half the excess
 deaths indicated by official data were explained by statistical aberrations, but with the
 advantage of hindsight we are not obliged to share his optimism. As I have previously
 observed, Soviet demographers have long been aware of Lorimer's adjustments but have
 not seen fit to alter their own judgment about the mortality rates prevailing in the late
 1920s. Anderson and Silver find the logic of this rebuke to their preferred adjustment
 "invisible ,"23 but it seems to me that they are grasping at straws. The long and short of
 the matter is this: they cannot demonstrate that Lorimer's arbitrary adjustment is right,
 and they cannot legitimately fault me for disagreeing with them on the impartial statistical
 grounds they claim to uphold.
 Anderson and Silver raise a variety of other objections against my calculations, in-
 cluding my excess death estimates for the 1940s,24 but they are similarly insubstantial.
 The most important of these is the demonstration that excess death estimates are sensitive
 to assumptions in variables.25 I do not deny this truism. It is essential to recognize,
 however, that the method both Lorimer and I apply yields mean value estimates and that
 these estimates fall within the range of Anderson's and Silver's own sensitivity calcula-
 tions.26 The variance around these means could be large, especially if the assumptions
 adopted are extreme, but there are no obvious reasons to believe that the true excess
 death count lies in the tail of the distribution required by their beliefs. Statistical uncer-
 tainty cannot be disregarded, but this verity neither validates their premises nor dem-
 onstrates that my estimates are biased.27
 23. Ibid., p. 523.
 24. Anderson and Silver contend that my excess death estimates for the 1940s, computed on
 the assumption that the 1939 census does not contain "dead souls" are wrong because the natality
 rates used for the years 1941-1945 are too high (this is the reason they assert my estimate is a
 population deficit, not an excess death statistic) and because Stephen Wheatcroft has uncovered
 other shortcomings (ibid., p. 522). The first objection is refuted by Rosa Sifman's anamnestic re-
 search. See Sifman, Dinamika rozhdaemosti v SSSR, p. 43. The second is disproven in Rosefielde,
 "Knowledge and Deception." Although, Soviet authorities have found it expedient to bury tens of
 millions of nonwar related excess dead in the "fog of war," we are not required to certify their
 deception, a point properly stressed by Nekrich. See Aleksandr Nekrich, Otreshis' ot strakha
 (London: Overseas Publication Interchange, 1979), p. 158.
 25. This method is adopted because "a source-by-source or statistic-by-statistic approach is not
 the only way to evaluate the quality of demographic estimates" (Anderson and Silver, "Demographic
 Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 519). This statement is true, but evaluation and disproof
 are two separate things. Their sensitivity tests illuminate underlying uncertainties but do not establish
 their contention that their preferred estimates are right, or that mine are wrong.
 26. In this regard it should be noted that while the purpose of Anderson's and Silver's sensitivity
 tests is to show that my findings are out of bounds, they actually confirm them. They write: "But it
 is clear that one would have to make an extraordinarily optimistic assumption about the 'normal'
 mortality rate, an assumption that the mortality rate was far lower than that reported for 1938-1939,
 to conclude that the number of excess deaths during 1927-1938 of persons who were alive in 1926
 was in the neighborhood of 8 or 10 million" (ibid., p. 528). If the 5.2 million adult excess deaths I
 compute with the 1939 census are properly used as a standard of reference, they fall neatly within
 Anderson's and Silver's range of admissibility, 3.2 million to 5.5 million adult excess deaths (ibid.,
 p. 529). See Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union," table 11, column 4, rows 3 and 4,
 p. 400. Lorimer's estimate similarly defined is 4.8 million excess fatalities. Anderson and Silver's
 reference to "8 or 10 million" excess deaths wrongly refers either to my estimates based on the 1939
 census including children or to my estimates based on the 1937 census.
 - 27. Three additional miscellaneous criticisms warrant brief comment. Anderson and Silver as-
 sert, "Rosefielde has been inconsistent in his assumptions about the 1939 census. [He contends] that
 the 1939 census was an overcount. But earlier, when interpreting the 1939 census count of people
 working for pay Rosefielde treated the 1939 census as if it were a 'good' census" (Anderson and
 Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 526). The purported contradiction
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 Anderson and Silver contend that there are no objective grounds for believing that
 the "catastrophes" of the 1930s caused more than a few million collectivization and famine
 deaths or that the demographic record supports Gulag forced labor and Terror counts on
 the scale I estimate. Accordingly, they assert that their judgment is based solely on the
 "facts" and that differences between our results are attributable to my technical errors.
 I have demonstrated above that this interpretation is wrong. My estimate of adult
 excess deaths between 1927 and 1939 based on the 1939 census falls squarely within the
 parameters established by their sensitivity estimates.23 The disparity between our assess-
 ments of Soviet demographic catastrophes thus does not rest, as they contend, on the
 alleged technical shortcomings of my calculations, but on differing premises. They believe
 without sufficient evidence that the tens of millions of excess deaths not related to the
 war indicated by official Soviet data between 1940 and 1949 are attributable to statistical
 error,29 that the 1939 census population statistic should be taken at face value despite
 compelling evidence to the contrary, and that the "arbitrary" adjustment made to the
 1926-1927 mortality rate by Lorimer is sacrosanct. If these assumptions are granted it
 follows directly that most of the demographic losses incurred under Stalin are attributable
 is entirely of their own contrivance. It does not necessarily follow that the census employment
 statistics are biased because the population aggregate is overstated. Moreover, I explicitly observed
 that the census employment statistics were incomplete because they omit unpaid penal workers; see
 Rosefielde, "Gulag Forced Labor," p. 73. On pp. 520-521 of their article Anderson and Silver split
 hairs about how best to define the concept of excess deaths. The purpose of this exercise is to imply
 that demographic analysis cannot support reliable assessments of fatalities caused by collectivization,
 Gulag, and the Terror. "We do not share Conquest's certitude about being able to estimate excess
 mortality from available demographic statistics" ("Demographic Analysis and Population Catastro-
 phes," p. 519). Their argument is sophistic. Coroners' reports for the victims of collectivization,
 famine, Gulag, and the Terror would be ideal, but estimates based on Lorimer's method and other
 corroborating evidence will suffice. Finally, Anderson and Silver attack the credibility of my estimates
 by claiming that I do not clearly grasp the distinction between population deficits and excess mor-
 tality: "But Rosefielde has interpreted population deficits as if they were excess (actual) deaths. For
 example, at one point he writes that 'these data indicate that the Soviet Union experienced 37 million
 excess deaths during the 1940s.' In fact, the figure to which he refers is an estimate of a population
 deficit, not of excess deaths" (ibid., p. 522). Both the assertions, that I have not clearly elaborated
 the distinction between these concepts and that the figure in question is a population deficit, are
 nonsense. With regard to the former see Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union," p. 385.
 Anderson and Silver do not spell out the rationale for their second allegation, but their text implies
 that they believe my natality statistics are unreliable: "It is extremely misleading to interpret popu-
 lation deficits as excess deaths because the population deficit includes . . . births that did not occur"
 (Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes," p. 522). This char-
 acterization is deceptive. It is predicated on the erroneous assertion that excess mortality estimates
 are only valid if birth statistics are completely accurate. Population deficits are distinguished from
 excess mortality estimates not by the precision of the birth data, but by the fact that the former are
 projections, whereas the latter are based on ex post facto statistics adjusted where necessary for
 missing observations. A glance at my computations reveals that I use ex post facto natality statistics,
 rather than projections, which yield excess mortality estimates as claimed, not population deficits.
 See Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union," table 5, p. 393. Anderson and Silver demur
 because they believe my wartime natality rates are unreliable. Perhaps they are, but as a comparison
 between my natality rates and those employed, by Lorimer for an earlier period demonstrate this
 does not mean that my estimates must be interpreted as population deficits; see my "Excess Mortality
 in the Soviet Union," table 5, p. 393, and table 2, p. 387.
 28. See note 26.
 29. Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union," table 12. Cf. Jean-Claude Chesnais,
 "Some Peculiarities of Eastern Europe and Soviet Population Trends," paper presented at the Third
 World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Washington, 30 October to 4 November 1985,
 pp. 6-8.
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 to the war and that only negligible numbers of excess dead can be ascribed to Gulag and
 the Terror.
 Alternatively, if these assumptions are rejected, as I have argued elsewhere they
 should be, my interpretation of the collectivization, famine, Gulag, and Terror catastro-
 phes is sustained. The controversy over the demographic consequences of Stalinism in
 the final analysis, thus, cannot be reduced to issues of method or technical misunder-
 standing. It is a substantive dispute that depends on the assessment of the catastrophic
 potential of Stalin's policies and the critical statistics that bear on them. This permits
 Anderson and Silver and me to debate the weight of the evidence but does not allow
 them to assert that my estimates misrepresent the official demographic record or are
 technically flawed because they are inconsistent with their premises.
